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1 Introduction
Wholesale electricity markets typically are concentrated: A small number of power companies
control the bulk of generation capacity, transmission bottlenecks constrain import possibilities,
and economical and political barriers limit large scale entry. Demand is insensitive to short
term changes in prices because household consumption mostly responds to monthly or yearly
price averages. Concentrated markets with price inelastic demand are susceptible to the exercise
of market power whereby producers behave strategically to raise profits. The performance of
liberalized electricity markets therefore poses a major concern to competition authorities and
other market monitors throughout the world.
Hydro power stands for more than half of the annual electricity production in more than one
third of the countries in the world (Førsund, 2007). A problem of evaluating market performance
in electricity markets which rely heavily on hydro power stems from the fact that hydro marginal
costs are problematic to estimate for outside observers. In a hydro power plant, the decision
problem facing management is how much of the plant’s reservoir to release today and how much
to save for future production. The marginal production cost in a hydro power plant consists
mainly of this opportunity cost of water, the so-called water value. The water value depends on
management’s expectations about the future value of the resource. Hence, it is impossible to
infer directly whether a hydro power plant running below full capacity sets competitive prices
or not.
We illustrate in a theoretical model the challenge of detecting market power in a hydro-
based electricity market. Hydro power production is a resource extraction problem. Hence,
the equilibrium condition is a generalization of the Hotelling rule, which in its most basic form
states that the price of a natural resource evolves proportionally to the real interest rate of
return, which we for simplicity set equal to zero. Imperfect competition and uncertainty imply
that a firm in our setting equates expected marginal revenues across time instead of expected
prices. By assumption, the firm maximizes expected utility and not expected profit. Its most
important implication is that resource extraction is adjusted by a risk correction factor, the
magnitude of which depends on the correlation between consumption and marginal revenue. In
addition, resource extraction is limited by production and/or reservoir constraints. To isolate
the effects of market power, one would therefore have to control for the technological constraints
and the effects of risk aversion on output and prices.
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Liberalized electricity markets consist of a collection of submarkets spread out across time.
Typically, generation companies can sell production up front at the day-ahead market, or they
can take contractual positions in the forward market. But they can also reserve capacity to
the delivery date and sell their production closer to real-time at various balancing markets. A
theoretical contribution of this paper is to recognize that firms’ multi-market presence can be
used to control for unobservable covariates when evaluating market performance.
First, production and reservoir constraints do not matter for the trade-off between selling
a given volume of production planned for day t + 1 in the day-ahead market at day t at price
f∗t+1 or saving it for the next day and selling it in real-time market at day t + 1 at expected
price Et[p∗t+1]. How to distribute a given amount of production across markets represents a
portfolio selection problem, the solution to which is given by the consumption CAPM (Blanchard
and Fischer, 1989). Hence, the expected marginal revenue in the real-time market equals the
marginal revenue in the day-ahead market at equilibrium, corrected for the covariance between
consumption and marginal revenue in the real-time market. In a competitive market, a (weakly)
risk-averse producer must on average receive a (weakly) higher price in the real-time market than
the day-ahead market, Et[p∗t+1] ≥ f∗t+1, to be willing to postpone sales until the next day. A
negative relationship would be inconsistent with perfect competition.
Second, the marginal value to a hydro power producer of withholding production from the
real-time market at day t and releasing it on the real-time market at day t+1 depends on similar
factors as the value of withholding sales from the day-ahead market at t and selling it on the
real-time market at t+1 instead. In the theoretical model, therefore, any difference between the
real-time price p∗t at t and the day-ahead price f∗t+1 at t for delivery at t+ 1 can be attributed
either to production/reservoir constraints or to market power. Real-time prices and day-ahead
prices are both risk-adjusted, so any risk correction cancels out. To isolate market power, it
remains to control for the technological constraints. Although these constraints are difficult to
estimate, it is considerably easier for an outsider to gauge whether they are likely to become
more or less severe from one day to the next. Electricity demand varies predictably across time.
For example, consumption is systematically higher on Mondays than Sundays. Tighter expected
production constraints at day t+1 drive up f∗t+1 relative to p∗t in a competitive market. Hence,
competitiveness implies that production changes between t and t + 1 are positively related to
the price difference f∗t+1 − p∗t . A negative correlation would be a sign of imperfect competition.
We apply these theoretical results to evaluate market performance at the Nordic power ex-
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change, Nord Pool Spot (NPS), for the period 2005 until 2009. The bulk of electricity production
in the Nordic market is sold on NPS’ day-ahead market, Elspot. Producers, retailers and large
industrial consumers can then re-balance their positions on NPS’ intra-day market, Elbas. Elbas,
which we treat as our real-time market, opens straight after the day-ahead market has closed
and is open until one hour prior to delivery.1 We show that the Elbas price on average was above
the Elspot price during the weekdays. But this relationship was reversed during the weekends,
which is inconsistent with competitive prices. We also establish that the Elspot price for delivery
day t+ 1 on average was higher (lower) than the Elbas price at day t if production at day t+ 1
was higher (lower) than the previous day. In summary, prices on NPS were largely consistent
with markets being competitive, but we reject the hypothesis that prices were at their competi-
tive levels throughout the period under examination. Specifically, we reject the hypothesis that
prices were competitive during weekends.
2 Related literature
Johnsen (2001), Førsund (2007) and Mathiesen et al. (2013) derive optimal hydro production
under assumptions of perfect competition or monopoly, whereas Crampes and Moreaux (2001),
Garcia et al. (2001) and Hansen (2009) analyse oligopolistic competition. Our theoretical
model extends these previous contributions by incorporating a day-ahead market in addition to
the real-time market into a hydro power model of imperfect competition. Multi-market presence
allows to derive predictions of market performance based upon the comparison of equilibrium
outcomes across markets.
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) build a theoretical model of forward contracting in a
competitive electricity market. Allaz and Vila (1993), Hughes and Kao (1997), Mahenc and
Salanié (2004) and Holmberg (2011) consider forward contracting in imperfectly competitive
wholesale electricity markets. These forward contracting models are static and therefore do not
capture the intertemporal dimension of hydro power markets. The present context also allows
imperfect competition at the forward (day-ahead ) stage, whereas previous contributions assume
forward markets to be perfectly competitive. Generation companies in our setting are run so
as to maximize expected utility of the decision maker. This specification allows to consider the
1National balancing markets operated by the national transmission system operators (TSOs) subsequently
take over. On top of the markets for physical delivery are the financial markets which allow market participants
to hedge their production or consumption portfolios.
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effects of risk aversion on market outcomes, but also encompasses risk neutral preference and
therefore profit maximization as a special case.
The empirical literature for the most part has approached the problem of unobservable
marginal costs by means of structural estimation techniques.2 Wolak (2003) uses bid data at
individual firm level from California whereas McRae and Wolak (2009) use similar bid data from
New Zealand to estimate firm-specific residual demand elasticities. They show that prices are
higher when residual demand is less elastic. These studies are exceptional because individual
bid data are hard to come by in many electricity markets, the Nordic market being one of
them. To account for the lack of firm-level data, some have placed additional structure on the
econometric model in terms of functional form assumptions (mostly linear-quadratic) for the
demand and the marginal cost of producing electricity. These studies often are based on the
well-known Bresnahan-Lau model; see Bask et al. (2011) or Graf and Wozabal (2013) for recent
examples. But the Bresnahan-Lau model is essentially static and cannot easily be modified to
capture the intertemporal aspects of hydro power markets. Indeed, estimation results turn out
to be sensitive to model specification; see e.g. Kim and Knittel (2006) for a critical evaluation.
Another strand of the literature explicitly accounts for intertemporality by building dynamic
numerical models of the electricity market. Examples of simulation models in this vein are Bush-
nell (2003), Kauppi and Liski (2008), and Philpott et al. (2010). Because of their computational
burdens, simulation models often need to take an aggregate market view. The Kauppi and Liski
(2008) model, for example, treats the Nordic region as a single integrated market and has a
weekly resolution. At these high aggregation levels, it is not possible to identify any exercise of
market power at the local level arising from bottlenecks and short-term demand variations.
The empirical approach suggested in this paper has minimal data requirements in the sense
that it only uses equilibrium prices and quantities. It does not rely on estimation of demand
and supply functions because predictions are derived directly from the first-order conditions for
expected utility maximization. This also means it is possible to investigate market performance
at the local market level.
2It is less complicated to evaluate market performance in electricity markets which rely mainly on thermal
energy because then reliable cost estimates based on engineering data for the individual power plants are readily
available; see Wolfram (1999) and Borenstein et al. (2002) for classical applications to the UK and Californian
electricity markets.
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3 Theoretical analysis
3.1 The model
Technology Consider a power company with N reservoir-based hydro power facilities. Hydro
power plant n ∈ N = {1, ..., N} produces qnt MWh of energy day t by a linear production
function. All direct costs associated with hydro production are fixed in the short run, hence
the marginal hydro production cost is zero. There is an upper bound qnt stemming from limits
to capacity. We allow the upper bound to vary as a function of time because scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance stops may cause capacity to fluctuate over time, so that real capacity
qnt sometimes is lower than nameplate capacity qn. Moreover, minimum flow requirements
stemming from environmental constraints might create a positive lower bound q
n
≥ 0. Hence,
at t production satisfies
qnt ∈ [qn, qnt] for all n ∈ N . (1)
Let rnt be the reservoir level in hydro plant n at the end of day t and denote by int reservoir
inflow during t, both measured in MWh. The reservoir level in facility n evolves according to
rnt ≤ rn(t−1) + int − qnt (2)
Write rn the maximum reservoir capacity. Each hydro power plant also has a minimal reservoir
level rn ≥ 0, which may be strictly positive for environmental (or other) reasons. At t, reservoirs
satisfy also
rnt ∈ [rn, rn] for all n ∈ N . (3)
Firms are not allowed to spill water. Hence, we can write (1)-(3) as the merged reservoir
constraints for all n ∈ N :
rnt ≥ Rn(rn(t−1)) = max{rn; rn(t−1) + int − qnt},
rnt ≤ Rn(rn(t−1)) = min{rn; rn(t−1) + int − qn}.
(4)
At this point it is pertinent to discuss the assumption of linear hydro power technology. In
day-to-day operations, water release is the only variable factor of production in a hydro power
plant. Two factors affect the efficiency with which water is converted into electricity. First, as
water is released from the dam, the height difference between the dam level and the turbine, the
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gross head, goes down. All else equal, a lower gross head implies lower production for given water
release. For large reservoir power plants, day-to-day variations in release have negligible effects
on the gross head, so this effect can safely be disregarded with the short time horizon considered
here. Second, each turbine converts water into energy more or less efficiently depending on how
much water is released through the turbine. Each turbine has an efficient operating span at
which production increases linearly with water release. To achieve maximum efficiency over a
wider production range, hydro power plants often have multiple turbines installed. Moreover,
firms often operate multiple power plants. Thus, a linear specification, as considered in most
of the theoretical literature (e.g. Crampes and Moreaux, 2001; Garcia et al., 2001; Førsund,
2007; Hansen, 2009) as well as simulation models (e.g. Bushnell, 2003; Kauppi and Liski, 2008;
Philpott et al., 2010) seems a reasonable first approximation to normal day-to-day operations.
Markets The firm’s aggregate production is qt =
∑N
n=1qnt. Some of this, zt−1 =
∑N
n=1zn(t−1),
is sold in the the day-ahead market (at t − 1) for delivery the subsequent day (at t). Residual
demand in the day-ahead market equals ft = Ft(zt−1, rt−1) and is differentiable in both argu-
ments. In general, residual demand depends also on the reservoir profile rt−1 = {rn(t−1)}Nn=1.
Rational competitors realize that rt−1 affects the future production decisions of the firm and
adjust their own production correspondingly and thereby residual demand; see Crampes and
Moreaux (2001). The rest of total production, xt =
∑N
n=1xnt, is sold in the real-time market„
where the firm faces the differentiable residual inverse demand pt = Pt(xt, zt−1, rt−1).
In the Nordic market, producers are required to submit to the TSO a production plan de-
tailing how they aim to cover their positions in the day-ahead market. This requirement implies
that aggregate bids in the day-ahead market cannot exceed aggregate production capacity:
zt ∈ [
∑N
n=1qn,
∑N
n=1qn] = [q, q]. (5)
The decision maker of the firm enters t with capital kt−1 and consumes ct, subject to the
budget constraint
ct + kt ≤ ptxt + ftzt−1 + kt−1. (6)
For simplicity (this is innocuous), the risk-free interest rate between two periods is zero. All
accounts pertaining to deliveries at t are settled and consumption takes place simultaneously, at
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the end of day t.
The decision problem The decision maker maximizes the expected utility of consumption
(adding a period discount rate would not add much to the analysis for reasons discussed below)
U(ct) +
∑∞
s=1Et[U(ct+s)]
subject to the reservoir constraints (4), the bidding constraint (5) and the budget constraint
(6). The subscripts on the expectations operator indicate that the decision is taken with regards
to the information available at t. In this model the producer simultaneously bids into the day-
ahead market for delivery the subsequent day, zt, and the real-time market for delivery today,
xt. With this timing, the day-ahead price for delivery the subsequent day, ft+1, and today’s
real-time price, pt, are determined simultaneously. The utility function U(·) is assumed to be
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in consumption, weakly concave and satisfy the
Inada conditions.
It is convenient to rewrite the maximization problem in terms of the problem of choosing
a reservoir profile rt for day t, how much to save for the subsequent day, kt, and how much to
commit to the subsequent day-ahead market, zt. By virtue of the production relation
xt =
∑N
n=1(rn(t−1) + int − rnt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
qt
− zt−1,
we can rewrite profit as a function of rt, zt−1 and rt−1:
pit(rt, zt−1, rt−1) =
Pt(∑Nn=1(rn(t−1) + int − rnt)− zt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt
, zt−1, rt−1)×
(
∑N
n=1(rn(t−1) + int − rnt)− zt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt
)
+ Ft(zt−1, rt−1)zt−1.
Non-satiation of consumption implies that the budget constraint (6) is binding. Consequently,
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the Bellman equation becomes
vt(zt−1, rt−1, kt−1) = maxzt,rt,kt{U(pit(rt, zt−1, rt−1) + kt−1 − kt)+
+
∑N
n=1[χnt(rnt −Rn(rn(t−1))) + χnt(Rn(rn(t−1))− rnt)]
+ λt(zt − q) + λt(q − zt) + Et[vt+1(zt, rt, kt)]},
where χ
nt
≥ 0 and χnt ≥ 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the reservoir
constraints (4), while λt and λt are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the bidding
constraint (5).
3.2 Optimum
Straightforward maximization with respect to the reservoir level in plant n ∈ N at date t ≥
1yields the first-order condition (optimal values are indicated by asterisks)
U ′(c∗t )
∂pit(r∗t ,zt−1,rt−1)
∂rnt
+ χ∗
nt
− χ∗nt
+Et[U
′(c∗t+1)
∂pit+1(r∗t+1,z
∗
t ,r
∗
t )
∂rnt
+ χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)− χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)] = 0.
To simplify notation, let ∂P ∗t+1/∂xt+1 = ∂P ∗t+1(x∗t+1, z∗t , r∗t )/∂xt+1 and ∂F ∗t+1/∂rnt = ∂Ft+1(z∗t , r∗t )/∂rnt.
Rewrite the first-order condition for the optimal reservoir level as (for all n ∈ N ):
p∗t +
∂P ∗t
∂xt
x∗t =
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
U ′(c∗t )
Et[p
∗
t+1 + (
∂P ∗t+1
∂xt+1
+
∂P ∗t+1
∂rnt
)x∗t+1 +
∂F ∗t+1
∂rnt
z∗t ]
+
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
U ′(c∗t )
covt[U ′(c∗t+1),p
∗
t+1+(
∂P∗t+1
∂xt
+
∂P∗t+1
∂rnt
)x∗t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
+
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
U ′(c∗t )
χ∗
nt
−χ∗nt−Et[χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)−χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
.
(7)
This optimality condition is a generalization of the celebrated Hotelling rule which in its most
basic form states that the price of a natural resource evolves proportionally to the real interest
rate of return, which in this model is equal to zero. Hence, the simplest version of the Hotelling
rule predicts price stability. Here, the firm which extracts the resource (water) potentially
exercises market power. Market power and uncertainty imply that the firm equates expected
marginal revenue across time. The assumption that the decision maker maximizes expected
utility instead of expected profit implies that future profit is discounted by the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution. This is the first line in eq. (7) above. Uncertainty and risk
aversion imply that resource extraction is adjusted by a risk correction factor, the magnitude
of which depends the correlation between consumption and marginal revenue in the real-time
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market. Risk correction is the term in the second line above. Finally, resource extraction is
limited by production and/or reservoir constraints captured by the shadow prices in the final
line of eq. (7).
Consider next optimal bidding in the day-ahead market. By way of the first-order condition
Et[U
′(c∗t+1)∂pit+1(r
∗
t , z
∗
t , k
∗
t )/∂zt] + λ
∗
t − λ∗t = 0,
the optimal contract position z∗t solves:
Et[p
∗
t+1 + (
∂P ∗t+1
∂xt+1
− ∂P
∗
t+1
∂zt
)x∗t+1] = f∗t+1 +
∂F ∗t+1
∂zt
z∗t −
covt[U ′(c∗t+1),p
∗
t+1+(
∂P∗t+1
∂xt+1
− ∂P
∗
t+1
∂zt
)x∗t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
+
λ∗t−λ
∗
t
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
.
(8)
For any planned production level qt+1 the subsequent period, the producer has the choice between
allocating some of it, zt, to the day-ahead market and saving the rest, xt+1, for the real-time
market. This decision is equivalent to a portfolio selection problem, in which a share of wealth is
invested up front with known return (the day-ahead market) and the rest in an asset with risky
future return (the real-time market). Owing to expected utility maximization, the optimum
is a variant of the consumption CAPM (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989), taking into account the
possibility of market power and bidding restrictions in the day-ahead market: Expected marginal
revenue in the real-time market equals marginal revenue in the day-ahead market, corrected by a
risk-aversion factor which depends on the correlation between consumption and marginal revenue
in the real-time market. Marginal revenue in the day-ahead market is deterministic here. In most
deregulated electricity markets, producers bid in supply functions. Supply functions generally
allow producers ex ante to optimally adapt production to every ex post realization of demand. It
is as if demand was, indeed, deterministic; see e.g. Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Wolak (2003)
and Holmberg (2008).
Finally, the first-order condition for the optimal savings decision gives the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution:3
Et[U
′(c∗t+1)]
U ′(c∗t )
= 1. (9)
3Optimal saving is why we can ignore discounting and why interest rates do not matter with the chosen time
horizon. In general, optimal saving is equivalent to δEt[U ′(c∗t+1)]/U ′(c∗t ) = (1 + r)−1 ≈ 1, where δ is the daily
discount rate and r is the daily risk-free interest rate (which is very close to 0).
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3.3 Theoretical predictions
Using (7) and (9) we obtain:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium real-time price evolves according to
p∗t+1 − p∗t = ∂P
∗
t
∂xt
x∗t − Et[(∂P
∗
t+1
∂xt+1
+
∂P ∗t+1
∂rnt
)x∗t+1]−
∂F ∗t+1
∂rnt
z∗t −
covt[U ′(c∗t+1),(
∂P∗t+1
∂xt
+
∂P∗t+1
∂rnt
)x∗t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
+
χ∗nt−χ∗nt+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)]−Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
− covt[U
′(c∗t+1),p
∗
t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
+ p∗t+1 − Et[p∗t+1].
(10)
Price fluctuations in real-time market have four potential explanations in this model: (i) the
exercise of market power - the sum of the terms on the first line of (10); (ii) binding production
and/or reservoir constraints - the first term on the second line of (10); (iii) risk aversion - the
second term on the second line of (10); (iv) surprise events causing price shocks - the final term
on the second line above. Under the assumption that price shocks are random with zero mean,
one would still have to control for the technological constraints and the effects of risk aversion
on prices to isolate the effects of market power in the real-time market.
Under normal market conditions a firm always bids a positive amount on the day-ahead
market, i.e. z∗t > q, and reserves some capacity for future eventualities, i.e. z∗t < q. We can
then rewrite the optimality condition (8) as:
Proposition 2. Under normal market conditions (q < z∗t < q), the equilibrium relation between
the expected real-time price Et[p∗t+1] and the day-ahead price f∗t+1 for delivery the same day (t+1)
equals
Et[p
∗
t+1]− f∗t+1 =
∂F ∗t+1
∂zt
z∗t + Et[(
∂P ∗t+1
∂zt
− ∂P
∗
t+1
∂xt+1
)x∗t+1] +
covt[U ′(c∗t+1),(
∂P∗t+1
∂zt
− ∂P
∗
t+1
∂xt+1
)x∗t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
− covt[U
′(c∗t+1),p
∗
t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
.
(11)
The production and reservoir constraints have disappeared compared with (10) because
they do not affect the choice of market, day-ahead or real-time, on which to sell the planned
production. If markets are competitive, then the terms on the first line vanish and all expected
price differences are due to risk aversion:
Et[p
∗
t+1]− f∗t+1 = − covt[U
′(c∗t+1),p
∗
t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
. (12)
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A negative demand shock which decreases the equilibrium price, p∗t+1, decreases also firm
profit, pi∗t+1 = p∗t+1x∗t+1 + f∗t+1z∗t , and therefore consumption, c∗t+1. Demand shocks thus im-
ply a (weakly) negative covariance of p∗t+1 and U ′(c∗t+1). A negative supply shock, such as a
production failure, decreases profit pi∗t+1 and consumption c∗t+1, but has no effect on the antic-
ipated equilibrium price p∗t+1 under perfect competition. Under perfect competition, therefore,
covt[U
′(c∗t+1), p∗t+1] < 0 if the decision maker is risk averse and zero if she is risk neutral. Hence,
we obtain our first null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Under normal market conditions and if the market is competitive, then Et[p∗+1] ≥
f∗t+1.
This hypothesis states that a risk-averse decision maker on average must receive a higher price
in the real-time market than the day-ahead market to be willing to take the risk of postponing
sales until the next day in a competitive market.
Next, subtract (11) from (10) and rearrange:
Proposition 3. The equilibrium relation between the real-time price p∗t and the day-ahead price
f∗t+1, both determined at the same time (t) is:
f∗t+1 − p∗t = ∂P
∗
t
∂xt
x∗t − Et[(∂P
∗
t+1
∂zt
+
∂P ∗t+1
∂rnt
)x∗t+1]− (
∂F ∗t+1
∂zt
+
∂F ∗t+1
∂rnt
)z∗t −
covt[U ′(c∗t+1),(
∂P∗t+1
∂zt
+
∂P∗t+1
∂rnt
)x∗t+1]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
+
χ∗nt−χ∗nt+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)]−Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
.
(13)
Once we have appropriately controlled for current and expected production and reservoir
constraints, any remaining price differences are necessarily due to the exercise of market power.
This relation holds independently of the decision maker’s attitude towards risk. Risk adjust-
ment vanishes here because trading in the real-time market the following period represents the
opportunity cost both of f∗t+1 and p∗t . Notice also that price differences are realized and not
expected because f∗t+1 and p∗t are simultaneously determined (at t).
The estimation problem lies in the fact that shadow prices on the constraints are unobservable
to outside observers and probably also correlated with the incentives to exercise market power.
But notice that equilibrium prices depend upon the difference between current and expected
shadow prices. While the level of the shadow prices is difficult to estimate, it could be easier
to predict how they change over time. Aggregate electricity consumption displays predictable
seasonal variation across the year, the week and over the course of the day.
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Let current aggregate production be Q∗t , and assume that producers are uncertain abut
future supply, but certain that it will be higher the subsequent period than today: Q∗t+1 > Q∗t .
Higher production means that q∗n(t+1) > q
∗
nt for one or more plants n ∈ N . Assume that at least
one of these plants is fully operational at t, so that qn(t+1) ≤ qnt. Collecting inequalities yields
qnt ≥ qn(t+1) ≥ q∗n(t+1) > q∗nt ≥ qn,
hence r∗nt > r∗n(t−1)+ int−qnt and r∗n(t+1) < r∗nt+ in(t+1)−qn. Assume also that current reservoir
conditions are normal: r∗nt ∈ (rn, rn). In this case, r∗nt > Rn(r∗n(t−1)) so that χ∗nt = 0. If
r∗nt+ in(t+1)− qn ≤ rn, then r∗n(t+1) < R(r∗nt), so that χ∗n(t+1) = 0, but if r∗nt+ in(t+1)− qn > rn,
then R′(r∗nt) = 0; see eq. (4). To summarize
χ∗nt−χ∗nt+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)]−Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
=
χ∗nt+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
≥ 0
in this case.
In the opposite case of producers ascertaining Q∗t+1 < Q∗t :
χ∗nt−χ∗nt+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)]−Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
= −χ
∗
nt
+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
≤ 0
for some facility n ∈ N under normal production conditions (qn(t+1) = qnt ≥ q∗nt > q∗n(t+1) ≥ qn)
and reservoir conditions (r∗nt ∈ (rn, rn)).
The two above inequalities and the competitive equilibrium condition
f∗t+1 − p∗t =
χ∗nt−χ∗nt+Et[χ∗n(t+1)R′n(r∗nt)]−Et[χ∗n(t+1)R
′
n(r
∗
nt)]
Et[U ′(c∗t+1)]
yield:
Hypothesis 2. Under normal production and reservoir conditions and if the market is compet-
itive, then (Q∗t+1 −Q∗t )(f∗t+1 − p∗t ) ≥ 0.
This hypothesis states that the day-ahead price tends to be higher (lower) than the current
real-time price at competitive equilibrium if production is anticipated to increase (fall) the
subsequent period. It corresponds to a peak-load pricing prediction applied to the day-ahead
and real-time market.
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4 Empirical analysis of the Nordic wholesale electricity market
4.1 Market description
The Nordic countries rely heavily on hydro power for electricity supply; see Table 1 below.
Half of the installed generation capacity is hydro power, predominantly located in Norway and
Sweden. Remaining generation capacity is for the most part Finnish and Swedish nuclear power
and other thermal power - mainly combined heat and power and condensing power - in Denmark,
Finland and Sweden. Wind power is a growing source of generation and is located primarily in
Denmark and Sweden.
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total
Hydro 0 3.2 30.7 16.2 50.1
Nuclear 0 2.7 0 9.4 12.1
Other thermal 9.8 11.1 1.1 8.0 30.0
Wind 4.2 0.3 0.7 3.7 8.9
Total 14.0 17.3 32.5 37.3 101.1
Table 1: Generation capacity (GWe) in 2012 (Source: NordREG, 2013)
Market concentration is fairly low on an aggregate level. There are five large producers, the
largest of which, Vattenfall, owns roughly 16 per cent of installed production capacity (Nor-
dREG, 2013). However, aggregate numbers do not give the full picture of market concentration.
Transmission bottlenecks on international connections often split the Nordic market into a sub-
set of national markets; see more on this below. Four of the five largest producers are former
national monopolies (the exception is E.ON) with generation assets concentrated to the home
market. Hence, national market concentration is higher than what the aggregate numbers would
seem to suggest. As an illustrative case in point, Vattenfall owns 37 per cent of Swedish gener-
ation capacity (NordREG, 2013). Joint ownership is widespread and creates collective market
concentration. All Swedish nuclear power, for example, is jointly owned by the three large pro-
ducers Vattenfall, Fortum and E.ON. Owing to local market concentration and joint ownership,
there is reason to be concerned about market performance in the Nordic wholesale electricity
market.
The cornerstone of the Nordic wholesale electricity market is the power exchange, Nord Pool
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Spot (NPS).4 In 2012, NPS traded 337.2 TWh electricity, which amounts to 77 per cent of
total consumption in the Nordic countries that year.5 NPS operates two main markets, the
most important of which is the day-ahead market, Elspot. Elspot handled 99 per cent (334
TWh) of NPS’ traded volume in 2012. The remaining 3.2 TWh were traded on the intra-day
market, Elbas.6 Elspot is divided into a number of smaller price areas, or zones, to account for
international and domestic transmission bottlenecks. There are two price areas in Denmark and
five in Norway, whereas Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania each constitute a separate price
area for the time being. Sweden was a single price area until October 31, 2011, subsequent to
which the country was split into four price areas.
We apply the methodology developed in the previous section to test for market power on
NPS in price area Sweden. Elspot is our day-ahead market, and we treat Elbas as our real-time
market. We examine the period January 1, 2005 until October 17, 2009, a data set that ends
before Sweden was split into multiple price areas. We thus avoid any complications associated
with the price area changes in Sweden.
4.2 The data
The day-ahead market - Elspot Participation at Elspot is voluntary, but only producers
with local generation capacity, local industrial consumers and retailers who serve local end users
are allowed to trade electricity there. Hence, Elspot is best described as a collection of regional
markets (price areas) with inter-regional trade limited by the capacity of the transmission lines.
Market participants submit hourly demand or supply curves for physical delivery over the
next day’s 24-hour period. Bidding for the 24 periods of day t commences at noon, day t − 2
and closes at noon, day t−1. Only the final bid curves prior to gate closure are binding. Hence,
it is relevant to view a company’s bid curves for the next 24 hours as one single observation.
NPS aggregates the individual supply and demand bids and clears the market by means of
a uniform price for each hour and price area, taking into account the transmission constraints.
The system price is the hourly clearing price for the entire market and would constitute the
equilibrium price absent any transmission constraints. But as bottlenecks are frequent, it makes
4NPS traces its origin back to 1991 when Norway established a trading system for wholesale electricity as part
of liberalizing its electricity sector. Sweden, Finland and Denmark subsequently joined to create what was then
the first multinational power exchange in the world. NPS has subsequently integrated with Continental Europe
and the Baltic countries.
5The rest of consumption stems from bilateral contracts between producers and industrial consumers or
represents direct deliveries internal to vertically integrated producers and retailers.
6All numbers are from the NPS Annual Report 2013 which can be accessed at www.nordpoolspot.com.
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sense to conduct the empirical analysis at price area level.
In summary, f∗t , corresponds to the average hourly Elspot price in price area Sweden for
delivery at day t . This corresponds to 1750 daily observations between January 1, 2005 and
October 17, 2009. The prices we use are in Euro per Megawatt-hour (MWh). Elspot prices can
be downloaded from Nord Pool Spot’s website (www.nordpoolspot.com).
The real-time market - Elbas Elbas opens two hours after Elspot gate closure and closes
one hour prior to physical delivery. Elbas resembles a regular stock market in the sense that
trading is continuous. Continuous trading implies that the same product typically is traded at
multiple prices over the course of the trading period as new market information arrives. For
instance, the Elbas price most likely is close to the Elspot price shortly after the market has
opened, but converges to the expected price at the balancing market as time evolves.
Owing to the comparatively low liquidity of Elbas, we calculate the hourly Elbas price by
averaging the price for the entire trading period weighted by traded volume. The real-time price
p∗t then is the average hourly Elbas price at day t. Elbas clearing prices are available at request
from NPS.
Additional variables Q∗t is the average hourly production in price area Sweden at day t.
Production data are available from the Swedish TSO, Svenska Kraftnät’s, website (www.svk.se).
As Figure 1 shows, average production is markedly lower on the weekends, corresponding to
weekly consumption patterns.7
NPS also has a system for reporting failures in the electricity network called Urgent Market
Messages (UMMs). In the regressions, we include a measure of UMMs indicating failures from
coal, hydro or nuclear plants of at least 100 megawatts. In particular, we include counts of
failure-hours that become known after the close of Elspot for any given day, thus they represent
events that affect supply and potentially prices on the Elbas market, but not the Elspot market.
We also assume that these failures are random events. As Figure 2 shows, the vast majority
of days are free from major plant outages, though multiple outages in a day are still common,
especially for coal and hydro plants.
7Calculations and statistical analysis are done using the R statistical programming language (R Core Team,
2013). All figures are drawn using the R package ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009).
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Figure 1: Average power production per day. Average production is substantially lower on
Saturdays and Sundays, reflecting the normal weekly consumption pattern
Figure 2: Box plot of the count of daily power plant failures in hours after the close of Elspot.
The vast majority of observations have zero failures, however multiple failures in a day are not
uncommon.
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Figure 3: The series of the difference between average daily prices on Elbas less average daily
prices on Elspot for delivery on day t. The series can be shown to be stationary, autocorrelated
and heteroskedastic.
4.3 Results
Recalling Hypothesis 1, that on average the real-time price (Elbas) should be higher than the
day-ahead price (Elspot) in a competitive market, Figure 3 shows the average difference between
the prices on the two markets at any given day. The differences fluctuate around zero, while it
appears that the Elbas price tends to be somewhat higher than the Elspot price when deviations
occur. Any large divergences tend to quickly revert to the mean. Unsurprisingly then, the series
can be shown to be stationary. However, the variance of the series appears to vary over time
and the series can also be shown to be autocorrelated.
As a test of the first hypothesis we run a regression represented by equation (14) where the
difference between the average Elbas price at day t, p∗t , and the average Elspot price for delivery
at day t (determined at day t − 1), f∗t , is our dependent variable. On the right hand side, we
include an intercept term, α, while UMMt represents a vector of variables for counts of coal,
hydro and nuclear power plant failures. t represents the error term. Hypothesis 1 is violated if
and only if the intercept is negative and statistically significant.
p∗t − f∗t = α+ βUMMt + t (14)
Table 1 reports the regression results for each separate day of the week.8 The average
Elbas price is higher than the average Elspot price all weekdays. The difference is statistically
significant at least at the 5% level all weekdays except Wednesday. These results are consistent
8Table formatting was done using the R package texreg (Leifeld, 2013)
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with (although not evidence of) competitive pricing during the weekdays. The intercept switches
sign during the weekends when the average Elbas price is lower than the average Elspot price.
This relationship is statistically insignificant on Saturdays but highly significant on Sundays.
Hence, we reject the null hypothesis that Elspot and Elbas prices were competitive in price area
Sweden during the entire sample period.
Production failures, in particular coal and hydro, tend to increase the Elbas price relative to
the Elspot price. The price effect is somewhat larger during the weekdays. This not surprising
given a wider availability of cheap reserve capacity during weekends.
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
(Intercept) 0.95∗∗ 1.06∗ 0.42 0.98∗ 1.01∗ −0.02 −0.71∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.48) (0.36) (0.43) (0.41) (0.22) (0.20)
failure: coal 0.05∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04 0.04∗ 0.03∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
failure: nuclear −0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
failure:hydro 0.04∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
Adj. R2 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Num. obs. 250 250 250 249 249 250 250
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 1: Table of regression results for tests of Hypothesis 1. Results are based on heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimates of standard errors.
To explore the second hypothesis we first create the series St = (Q∗t+1 −Q∗t )(f∗t+1 − p∗t ), the
difference between production in day t + 1 and production in day t multiplied by the Elspot
price for delivery in day t+ 1 less the Elbas price for delivery in day t. The series is plotted in
Figure 4. Again, the series can be shown to be stationary, however the series is autocorrelated
and the variance of the series clearly varies over time (heteroskedasticity).
We use St as the left-hand side of the regression represented by equation (15), while on the
right-hand side we again include an intercept term, α, a vector of variables, UMMt, representing
power plant failures, and an error term t. Separate regressions are run for each day of the week.
St = α+ βUMMt + t (15)
Table 2 displays the regression results. These results are all consistent with competitive
pricing. The intercept is of the expected sign for all weekdays and statistically significant at
least at the 5% level all days except Tuesday. The intercept comes out with a much higher
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Figure 4: The constructed series used to evaluate Hypothesis 2. The series can be shown to be
stationary, but autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are present.
coefficient Friday and Sunday. In the first instance, this is due to a significant drop in production
from Friday to Saturday and a correspondingly higher Elbas price on Friday than the Elspot
price for delivery on Saturday. The Sunday coefficient picks up the production increase from
Sunday to Monday, and the Elspot price for delivery on Monday is higher than the Elbas price
on Sunday. What is interesting to note is that the price differences tend to be of the same sign
as the realized production changes also for the other weekdays. Although average production
changes are indiscernible from one weekday to the next, see Figure 1, the market seems to be
able to predict whether total production will increase or decrease the subsequent day, and these
anticipated production changes are priced in the market.
Failures for the most part have no significant effect on St. From a theoretical viewpoint, this
should not be surprising in view of our assumption that f∗t+1 and p∗t are set simultaneously at
date t. The regression results indicate that there is some merit to this assumption.
4.4 Discussion of the results
Our estimations partially reject Hypothesis 1, but fail to reject Hypothesis 2. In summary,
we reject the joint hypothesis that prices at NPS were at their competitive levels throughout
the period under examination. The next question is whether the observed price differences
are consistent with the exercise of market power. To simplify the discussion, assume that the
producers are risk neutral and that the amount bid into the day-ahead market does not affect
residual demand in the real-time market, i.e. ∂P
∗
t+1
∂zt
= 0. The optimality condition (11) then
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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Intercept 22283.41∗∗ 5349.23 14176.55∗ 15347.73∗∗ 114622.60∗∗∗ 20161.79∗∗ 252346.44∗∗∗
(6709.20) (4974.70) (6294.20) (5563.61) (18815.52) (6200.60) (20022.30)
failure: coal 41.23 81.21 304.19 582.67 2230.29∗ 1069.03∗∗ 1691.55
(335.81) (267.96) (333.61) (299.79) (980.23) (385.83) (1288.90)
failure: nuclear −480.64 632.59 159.44 39.57 −633.06 486.97 −1185.97
(794.89) (444.22) (635.84) (526.80) (2035.68) (654.98) (1590.39)
failure: hydro −275.21 164.65 −117.50 43.33 878.97 184.16 649.79
(319.52) (178.89) (252.61) (262.66) (896.16) (341.16) (1207.79)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01
Adj. R2 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
Num. obs. 250 250 250 249 249 249 250
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 2: Table of regression results for tests of Hypothesis 2. Results are based on heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimates of standard errors.
becomes
Et[p
∗
t+1]− f∗t+1 =
∂F ∗t+1
∂zt
z∗t − Et[
∂P ∗t+1
∂xt+1
x∗t+1].
Under the assumption that the average Elbas price is an unbiased estimate of the expected real-
time price, the left-hand side of the above equation has been estimated to be strictly negative
on Sundays. This is consistent with the exercise of market power in the day-ahead market
on Saturdays (for delivery on Sundays). Transmission constraints often are non-binding during
weekends because of low demand. Elspot therefore displays a large degree of integration between
the different price areas on Saturdays and Sundays. Hence, one might expect competition
on Elspot to be more intense during weekends. Suppose therefore that Elspot is competitive
(∂F
∗
t+1
∂zt
= 0). Since the price is falling in the quantity supplied (∂P
∗
t+1
∂xt+1
≤ 0), the estimated
relationship is consistent with producers being over-contracted in the real-time market (x∗t+1 < 0)
so that they exercise buyer power with the purpose of decreasing the real-time price on Sundays.
The above equation also identifies a weakness of the diagnostic test we have proposed. The
left-hand side of the above equation has been estimated to be strictly positive on weekdays.
This is consistent with perfect competition and risk-aversion, but it is also consistent with
Elspot being perfectly competitive and producers exercising seller power on Elbas. Given the
limited number of participants in the real-time market and the relatively small volumes traded
on Elbas, this is not an unlikely scenario. Hence, the tests proposed in this paper should only
be seen as a first test of market performance and is no perfect substitute for more detailed tests
based upon, say, observed bidding behaviour.
A possible explanation other than market power for the deviant prices could be that the
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average Elbas price produces a downward-biased estimate of the expected real-time price during
weekends. This could be explained for example by a lower market liquidity on Saturdays and
Sundays failing to deliver “correct” market prices. But if we return to Tables 1 and 2, we see
that prices respond in a similar manner to reported production failures during the weekends as
during the weekdays. For example, coal failures tend to drive up the Elbas price by nearly the
same amount relative to the Elspot price on Saturdays and Sundays compared to the rest of the
week. The only anomaly in the data is the average Elbas price being smaller than the average
Elspot price on Sundays. It is not unreasonable to draw the conclusion that this can be traced
back to rational bidding behaviour, rather than incorrect prices.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed in a theoretical framework the link between day-ahead and real-time
market performance in a hydro-based wholesale electricity market. We have derived tests of
market performance directly from the first-order conditions and applied them to evaluate the
Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool Spot (NPS). Our results reject the null hypothesis that NPS
was characterized by perfect competition in all markets throughout the period of investigation.
The informational requirements of the methodology are weak. We only use equilibrium
prices and production. Individual bid data are not necessary, nor is it necessary to estimate
demand and marginal cost functions. We control for risk aversion because the model builds
upon expected utility maximization as its behavioral assumption.
Owing to its simplicity, the methodology necessarily brings with it some drawbacks. It is
only a diagnostic test of whether the market can be considered competitive. In case of rejection,
it is impossible to estimate markups without more detailed data. Also, we run the risk of
underestimating market power because price relations consistent with perfect competition are
also consistent with the exercise of market power. Hence, the methods proposed in this paper
are by no means perfect substitutes for elaborate simulation models or estimation methods built
upon detailed bid data. Rather, we see the methodology as a first and simple step in the analysis
of the performance of hydro-based electricity markets.
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